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ABSTRACT 
This thesis on Experiment 11 concentrates on two conditions of the main 
independent variable:  the position of the ISR Officer.  Analysis compares 
different performance variables under the two ISR role structures.  Condition I is 
comprised of an ISR Coordinator (ISR Coord), a Sea Combat Commander (SCC) 
and a Marine Expeditionary Unit Commander (MEU).  Condition II is comprised 
of an ISR Commander (ISR Cdr), an SCC and a MEU.  Both ISR Officer 
conditions are examined in a HA/DR scenario.  The assessment of performance 
includes responsiveness of the two conditions when assets are reduced.  
Participants were asked to plan for the allocation of ISR assets and then re-plan 
when assets were reduced.  Thus, this experiment also examines the simulator 
as input for operational-level planning. 
This thesis also compares the findings from Experiment 11 with the 
findings from Experiment 10 to determine if the ISR management structure, 
reduction in assets and incorporated planning process in Experiment 11 to 
determine how the ISR management structure in Experiment 11 affected the 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. OVERVIEW 
The Adaptive Architectures for Command and Control (A2C2) program is 
sponsored by the Office of Naval Research (ONR). The work of Experiment 11 
was led by researchers from the Naval Postgraduate School, with support from 
Aptima and the University of Connecticut.   
The A2C2 research program has focused on helping to define adaptive 
command structures for future joint and combined forces.  In particular, A2C2 
Experiment 10 investigated efficient structures for C2 of intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance assets in an Expeditionary Strike Group (Kennedy, 2007).  
The current work revisits some of these results with further human-in-the-loop 
experimentation.   
B. PROBLEM 
The challenge in today’s range of defense operating environments is 
designing a C2 organization that is able to multi-task in a high tempo operations 
without losing resources.  In Bestoso (2005) it was determined that military 
organizations require C2 structures to facilitate effective wide range coordination 
and efficiency in mission performance.  
Bestoso (2005) conducted research on the capabilities and nominal tasks 
of an Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG).  The focus of analysis was the 
consideration of human skills and abilities in decision-making in conjunction with 
planning cycles to adequately model a command and control organization.  ESG 
was a new concept accompanied with uncertainties pertaining to anticipated 
actions and missions in command and control.  The research concluded that the 
ESG was able to conduct joint operations with the navy, manage assets and  
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perform missions.  Although it appears that the ESG is capable of multi-tasking, 
often times they were overwhelmed with tasks, which in turn stressed the 
capacity of decision makers or assets. 
C. SCOPE 
Examination of ESG operations indicates that they are a combination of 
special operations, humanitarian assistance, maritime security operations and 
peacekeeping operations.  These operations are heavily dependent upon ISR 
assets that are often spread across component commanders and are multi-
tasked.  This makes the ISR mission the ideal candidate to test the different C2 
structures that might address many of the problems found in Bestoso (2005). 
A2C2 formed its first relationship with ESG in 2004.  During that time, 
Admiral Michael LeFever was selected to command ESG-1.  Adm LeFever 
established communications with the Office of Naval Research (ONR) to request 
the A2C2 and CMD 21 programs to advise the development of adaptive C2 
architectures for his ESG.  The initial studies focused on structures and 
processes related to both planning and operations that an ESG would participate 
in either as a stand-alone force or as part of a JTF.  In 2006, data were gathered 
from ESG personnel and from observing ESG operations for the purpose of 
future scenario building for future A2C2 laboratory simulation experiments (Weil, 
et al., 2006).  The following organizational challenges were identified:  
establishment of an ISR Commander/Coordinator; management and allocation of 
limited assets over many possible missions; and synchronizing planning cycles.   
The A2C2 research group staged Experiment 11 to respond to the 
challenges listed above.  Experiment 11 was designed with two management 
structures, Condition I and Condition II.  Condition I is comprised of an ISR 
Coordinator (ISR Coord), a Sea Combat Commander (SCC) and a Marine 
Expeditionary Unit Commander (MEU).  The ISR Coord does not own any ISR 
assets, but takes an active role in de-conflicting asset scarcity problems, 
monitoring tasks to assure periodic updates and assessments are current, 
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coordinating with SCC and MEU, monitoring e-mail and intelligence messages 
and striving for efficiency in the use of ISR assets.  Condition II is comprised of 
an ISR Commander (ISR Cdr), a Sea Combat Commander (SCC) and a Marine 
Expeditionary Unit Commander (MEU).  The ISR Cdr controls high-value ISR 
assets (UAVs), monitors ISR taskings from higher authority, coordinates with 
SCC and MEU, monitors e-mail and intelligence messages and strives for 
efficiency in the use of ISR assets. 
The A2C2 research team evaluated the performance of seven teams in 
both ISR Officer conditions in an HA/DR scenario in which assets were reduced.  
Four teams performed in Condition I and three teams performed in Condition II.  
The post-experiment analysis results were compared with expected results from 
Experiment 11 and results from Experiment 10.  Participants were asked to plan 
for the allocation of ISR assets and then re-plan when assets were reduced.  
Thus, this experiment also allows for the evaluation of the simulator as input for 
operational-level planning. 
D. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THESIS 
The work conducted in this thesis contributes to the foundation of 
discovering more efficient ways for command and control of ISR assets.  Modern 
advanced technology is making progress in the ISR field creating a greater 
demand on  ISR assets. It seems every commander now requires real time 
coverage of his/her Area of Responsibility (AOR).  This requirement has 
exceeded the current ISR asset supply.  In order to satisfy this demand new, 
innovative methods of managing primary and secondary ISR capabilities must be 
discovered.  The DDD simulator with its established and detailed scenario design 
work is an ideal system to perform experiments utilizing various Command and 
Control structures to determine which structures contribute to ISR asset 
management efficiency. 
A further contribution is the demonstration of the ways in which the DDD 
simulator may be utilized as a training tool by military units.  Having worked out 
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the intricate details of how to incorporate assets, tasks and units into the DDD 
scenarios, it would be an uncomplicated matter to manipulate these attributes 
and customize the simulator to fit unit specific training requirements.  The DDD 
simulator can be customized by entering a unit’s ISR structure, assets and tasks 
to train units for specific missions past, present or future.  DDD may be utilized 
as a training tool for all services. 
Finally, this thesis and Experiment 11 also examines the simulator as 
input for operational-level planning and can contribute a wealth of data to be 
analyzed in the future about teamwork and the planning process.  Further 
analysis options are detailed in Chapter V, Recommendations for Future 
Experiments.   
E. SUMMARY OF THESIS 
Chapter II provides a historical background on Command and Control, 
DDD Simulation and A2C2. 
Chapter III lays a detailed description of the conduct of Experiment 11. 
Chapter IV provides an analysis of the results from Experiment 11 and 
compares them with expected results and results from Experiment 10. 
Chapter V summarizes the thesis, provides recommendations for future 
experiments and concludes the thesis. 
Appendices contain all documents utilized in the experiment and data 







II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND  
A. OVERVIEW 
The A2C2 program utilizes model-based experimentation to examine 
alignment and adaptation of Joint Command and Control management structures 
to mission requirements.  This experiment evolved from the previous ten 
experiments.  Experiments 1 and 2 studied the interaction between task structure 
and organization structure.  They described a process for developing military 
operational scenarios within a task structure context.  Experiment 3 focused on 
how organizations adapt their structures to maximize their effectiveness under 
changing events.  Experiment 4’s goal was to further investigate the results of 
Experiment 3.  Experiment 5 utilized Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) 
Tactical Warfare Simulator (MTWS) to re-examine selected research questions 
from Experiment 4 and focused on the performance of Joint Task Force decision-
makers in model based and traditional Joint Task Force (JTF) architectures.  
Experiment 6 was a transition event where A2C2 concepts and methodologies 
were applied to actual operating forces.  Experiment 7 involved the introduction 
of complex, unexpected tasks requiring multi-node coordination into the 
simulation scenario and the examination of two disparate command and control 
architectures in dealing with these unexpected tasks.  Experiment 8’s objective 
was to study the adjustments that organizations make when they are confronted 
with a scenario for which their organizational structure is ill-suited.  Experiment 9 
provided insight into the challenges faced by an organization in the process of 
adaptation and factors that affect the willingness and perceived need for 
adaptation.  Experiment 10 focused on developing an effective and efficient C2 
structure to support and utilize the increasing ISR capabilities being employed by 
Navy/Marine Corp Expeditionary Strike Groups.  While Experiment 11 continued 
the examination of ISR management in an ESG, it also was intended to lay the  
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ground work for future A2C2 experiments dealing with operational-level planning 
for organizations such as Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations 
Centers (MHQ/MOC).     
B. COMMAND AND CONTROL 
Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a 
properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the 
accomplishment of the mission.  Its functions are performed through an 
arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities and procedures 
employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating and controlling 
forces and operations in the accomplishment of a task. (JP-1)   
There are many different areas that play a role in command and control. 
Organizational structure is one of the most important, due to the obstacles 
leadership encounters. The challenges for effective command and control are not 
surprising due to the growing requirements since 1939.  This growth is due to  
(Van Creveld 1985):  1)increased demands made on command systems by 
present-day warfare; 2) technological developments that have multiplied the 
means at the disposal of command systems; 3) changes in the nature of the 
command process, resulting from the interaction of factors 1 and 2; 4) the 
appearance of new weapons systems that, when coupled with structural changes 
inside command systems themselves, have increased the vulnerability of 
command systems; and  5) the rise in costs, caused by factors 1 through 5  
Although command and control has evolved from Stone Age chieftains 
and commanders on horses to commanders in command centers, it still remains 
that effective command and control allows decision makers to optimize available 
assets.  Command and control recognizes  the continued increase in capabilities 
of personnel, technology and processes.  If properly coordinated they allow for 
effective decision making. 
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C. DDD SIMULATION 
Distributed Dynamic Decision making (DDD) was developed jointly by 
University of Connecticut, Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Monterey and 
Aptima.  The first version (DDD-I) was incorporated over twenty years ago and 
utilized from 1984-1989; DDD-II 1989-1994; DDD-III 1994-2008; and DDD-IV 
2008.  DDD is funded largely by the Office of Naval Research A2C2 program and 
captures the functional relationship of team dynamics, organizational structure, 
asset capabilities and task requirements.  DDD has been utilized in over thirty 
five experiments by NPS and other navy/Department of Defense (DoD) 
organizations.  It is an empirical research tool for lab-based experimentation for 
the study of command and control in varying operational conditions (Kleinman, 
2008). 
D. A2C2 
Sponsored by the Office of Naval Research (ONR), the Adaptive 
Architecture for Command and Control (A2C2) program utilizes model-based 
experimentation.  The objective of the A2C2 program is to support military forces 
by looking at innovative joint command and control management structures that 
are adaptable and meet the rapid changing demands of changing adversaries 
and missions.  The A2C2 research program also integrates optimization, 
modeling and simulation-based research efforts with psychology-based and 
experimental activities.  Naval Postgraduate School’s emphasis is on evaluating 
model-based organizational designs through human-in-the-loop experimentation 
(Hutchins, et al., 2007).   
E.   HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The proliferation of ISR assets within an ESG creates a challenge for 
efficiently commanding and controlling those assets.  Every ESG Commander 
has his own method of overcoming this obstacle, but none of those methods are 
standard procedures or documented in a doctrine for all ESGs to follow.  Bestoso 
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(2005) concluded that with the increased tasking assigned to the ESG and the 
increased workload that comes with it, a better way to perform the C2 functions is 
needed in order to reach the ESG’s full potential.  Kennedy (2007) was 
inconclusive as to which of the three ISR Officer role structures examined in 
A2C2 Experiment 10 was more effective; the results were judged ambiguous 
because of limited data.  Entin and Weil (2007) concluded that the most effective 
of the three levels in experiment 10 was that of the ISR Commander.   
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III. EXPERIMENT METHODOLOGY 
A. OVERVIEW 
In Experiment 11, the A2C2 research team conducted a follow-on to prior 
work to determine an effective ISR management structure at the operational level 
of conflict by comparing two structural conditions:  Condition I contained an ISR 
Coordinator and Condition II contained an ISR Commander.  In addition, the 
experimental sessions incorporated team planning for the allocation of assets 
and opportunities for re-planning when faced with a reduced asset situation.   
B. FOUNDATION 
Experiment 11 is an expansion of Kennedy’s thesis from 2007 on the role 
of the ISR Officer, where three levels of the ISR role existed.  Kennedy 
concluded that there did not appear to be any definitive increase in efficiency or 
effectiveness with the presence of an ISR Coordinator or ISR Commander on an 
ESG staff.  Experiment 11 was conducted in an attempt to achieve a more 
definitive answer on the role of the ISR Coordinator and the ISR Commander that 
Experiment 10 was unable to.  This was done by establishing time requirements 
for re-visit rates, assessment rates and re-assessment rates to establish more 
definitive measures of performance.  Experiment 11 also incorporated planning 
with a reduction in the number of available assets.  By incorporating planning and 
re-planning, it was a way to transition towards examining operational-level 
activities in the experimental environment. 
C. BACKGROUND  
The focus of the A2C2 research program has been examining command 
structures for future Naval, Joint and Combined forces using model-based 
simulations and human-in-the-loop experimentation. In 2005, the A2C2 team was 
asked to investigate the adaptive C2 challenges of an Expeditionary Strike Group 
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(ESG). The investigation was broken into three phases; Assessment, 
Comparison, and Optimization.  The A2C2 team had two primary goals in this 
activity.  The first was to gather data to give immediate feedback to ESG 
Commander regarding possible ways to improve adaptive C2.  The other was to 
gather data that would inform the design of a scenario that could be brought into 
the research laboratory for systematic testing of adaptive C2 issues relevant to 
the ESG.  Seven issues were identified from the preliminary data collection which 
were then narrowed, with input by ESG staff, to their top three priorities.  Of the 
top three priorities, the A2C2 team decided to focus their efforts on the 
Establishment of an ISR Commander/Coordinator (Kemple, et al., 2006).    
D. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
For Experiment 11, the A2C2 research team used two independent 
variables and integrated planning with a reduction of assets.  The research 
questions established for Experiment 11 are:  
1) How effective was the management structure at Condition I and 
Condition II at conducting initial task measurements and revisit task 
measurements? 
2) What impact did the integration of planning and the reduction of assets 
have on the management structures? 
3) Which ISR Officer condition was most effective in completing the 
assigned tasks? 
To answer each research question, players were separated into groups to 
represent each ISR Officer role.  To be able to compare the two roles fairly, each 
group was assigned the same tasks with set revisit parameters. 
The independent variable in Experiment 11 is the role of the Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Officer.  This experiment concentrated 
on the two conditions of the ISR Officer:  ISR Coordinator (Coord) and ISR 
Commander (Cdr). 
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Condition I has an ISR Coord who does not own any assets, but can be 
actually engaged or lead in de-conflicting high demand low density assets, 
monitoring tasks to assure periodic updates and assessments are current, 
coordinating with SCC and MEU, monitoring e-mail and intelligence messages 
and striving for efficiency in the use of ISR assets. 
Condition II has an ISR Commander.  The ISR Commander controls high-
value ISR assets (UAVs), conducts ISR taskings from higher authority, 
coordinates with SCC and MEU, monitors e-mail and intelligence messages and 
strives for efficiency in the use of ISR assets. 
E. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
In Experiment 11, A2C2 researchers compared two ISR management 
structures at the operational level of conflict.  Participants were asked to plan for 
the allocation of ISR assets and then re-plan when assets were reduced.  The 
two management structures are that of the ISR Coordinator at Condition I and 
ISR Commander at Condition II. 
The participants in this experiment are multi-service members with various 
job specialty backgrounds, different experiences and different amount of years of 
service.  Each participant was required to complete demographic survey, which 
provided background information on each participant.  There were 25 students, 
six researchers and four students to perform the duties as monitors.  The teams 
were broken into seven teams of three:  A, B, C, D, E, F and G.  They were 
further broken down into the two conditions.  Teams A, C, E and G are at 
Condition II, which is comprised of an ISR Cdr, SCC and a MEU.  Teams B, D 
and F are at Condition I, which is comprised of an ISR Coord, SCC and a MEU.  
Once students were assigned teams, they were able to decide amongst 
themselves which role they would take on.   
The ISR Cdr responsibilities include taking an active role in controlling 
high-value ISR assets (UAVs), conducting ISR taskings from higher authority, 
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coordinating with SCC and MEU, monitoring e-mail and intelligence messages 
and striving for efficiency in the use of ISR assets.  The ISR Coord  is 
responsible for taking an active role in de-conflicting high demand low density 
assets, monitoring tasks to assure periodic updates and assessments are 
current, coordinating with SCC and MEU, monitoring e-mail and intelligence 
messages and striving for efficiency in the use of ISR assets, but does not own 
any ISR assets.  MEU is overall responsible for land operations.  This includes 
the following:  1) maintaining situational awareness of buildings, fishing villages, 
military ground patrols, refugee camps and truck convoys; 2) locate ground 
search and rescue and conduct rescue; 3) respond to external ISR tasking; 4) 
eliminate hostile CDLs and SAMs; 5) coordinate with SCC and ISRC; 6) take 
action according to ZIPPOs.  SCC is overall responsible for maritime operations.  
This includes the following:  1) maintain situational awareness of fishing boats, 
merchant vessels, oil tankers and patrol crafts; 2) conduct any at sea search and 
rescue; 3) respond to external ISR tasking; 4) coordinate with MEU and ISRC; 5) 
take action according to ZIPPOs.      
The experiment was scheduled for two weeks.  Week one was to conduct 
training for familiarization with scenario and simulation software and week two 
was performing data runs.  The schedule appears in Table 1.   
 
 
Table 1.   Experiment Schedule 
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There are four sessions in this schedule.  A session can be defined as every time 
a team is scheduled in the lab.  A run is the tempo level of the DDD simulation.  
Run 1 is less busy and run 3 is the busiest.   
In session 1 the following occurred: 
1) Participants completed consent forms, 5 minutes 
2) Role selection confirmation, 5 minutes 
3) Buttonology training following the step by step DDD tutorial; researchers 
utilized the DDD Training Pointers to Cover During Buttonology Training 
sheet, 90 minutes 
4) Break, 10 minutes 
5) Buttonology training without the step by step tutorial, 30 minutes 
In session 2 the following occurred: 
1) Scenario play run 1 with researchers conducting training, 45 minutes 
2) Break, 10 minutes 
3) Scenario play run 1 with continued with reduced training guidance, 45 
minutes 
In session 3 the following occurred: 
1) Based on the familiarity with the scenario and mission from session 2, 
each team was allotted time to verbally plan and discuss plan of attack, 5 
minutes 
2) Scenario play run 2 with minimal guidance from researchers, unless 
assistance was requested or participants appeared uncertain in what 
action(s) to take, 35 minutes 
3) Break,5 minutes 
4) Conduct verbal discussion of prior performance and any planning 
adjustments, 5 minutes 
5) Scenario play run 3, 20 minutes.  Participants were allowed to play run 3 
just to get an idea of a now increased tempo   
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6) Team planning for next session, 35 minutes.  Teams were required to 
complete planning sheets for SCC, MEU and ISR.  If teams were unable 
to complete the planning sheet they were authorized to take them home 
as homework. 
In session 4 the following occurred: 
1) Players complete Demographic survey 
2) Teams review plan from session 3, 5 minutes 
3) Scenario play run 3, 20 minutes 
4) Monitors start collecting data at 15 minutes of game play 
5) Pause run 3 at 20 minutes of game play 
6) Break, 5 minutes 
7) Researchers remove assets from simulation during break (MEU:  2 RECC 
and 1 XH-30; SCC:  1 RHIB and 1 UAV) 
8) After break brief players on loss of assets (called to other missions by 
COCOM) and provide feedback from monitoring sheets on quality of 
performance and allow players to re-plan, 10 minutes 
9) Continue to play run 3 
10) Monitors start collecting data at 30 minutes of game play 
11) Monitors start collecting data at 45 minutes of game play 
12) Stop game at 50 minutes of game play 
13) Provide feedback from monitoring sheets 
14) Players complete Post-Experiment survey 
15) Players complete NAS TLX survey 
16) Monitors complete Teamwork Assessment survey 
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F. SCENARIO DESIGN 
1. Environment 
Experiment 11 was conducted in a Systems Technology Battle Lab 
(STBL).  The lab is well lit and spacious.  Each player was provided a 
workstation, a player binder, communication capability with each team member, 
writing utensils and scratch paper.  A table with chairs were available for use as 
well as a large screen display with the operational picture for use during 
planning.  By utilizing the DDD it was not necessary to conduct the experiment in 
a combat information center (CIC) onboard ship.  DDD works as a training tool to 
prepare personnel for success in real-world missions and captures the functional 
relationship of team dynamics.  The goal in this environment is valid 
experimentation on Command and Control, not a duplication of operational 
conditions.    
2. Briefing 
One week prior to conducting Experiment 11, participants were given a 
brief on Experiment 11 Adaptive Architecture for Command and Control (A2C2) 
and an overview of Dynamic Distributed Decision making (DDD) simulation.  
Participants were already separated into 7 groups of 3 and assigned a 
management structure, but not assigned a role in the structure. 
Experiment 11 A2C2 brief provided participants with the geopolitical 
situation, status of countries involved, area of responsibility, different 
management structures, responsibilities of each decision maker, organization of 
forces (assets and their locations), utilization of the Asset Capability for 
Measuring Task Attributes sheet and utilization of ZIPPOs.   
DDD brief provided participants with a brief overview of the history of DDD 
and an what to expect in the lab.   
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Participants were provided a folder with the following items:  1) 
Experiment 11 A2C2 brief 2) legend of task symbology 3) screen shot of area of 
responsibility (AOR) 4) asset acronyms 5) Operation Ensuring Hope brief 6) 
measuring task attribute sheet 7) fishing boat ZIPPO 8) task description.  By 
providing participants with the briefing and resources, this allowed them ample 
time to review the items at their leisure and clear up any questions they may 
have had prior to the experiment.  Upon completion of the briefing, participants 
decided which role each participant in the group would assume. 
3. Geopolitical Background 
The fictitious geopolitical background utilized in this scenario is as follows: 
Thirty days ago the country of Asiland was struck by a Tsunami that 
caused massive damage to the country’s infrastructure as well as incalculable 
losses to her civilian populace.  Following the tsunami, a lack of response from 
the Asiland government to the disaster has resulted in multitudes of Asiland 
citizens fleeing south looking for help and better conditions.  The southern 
exodus, which was both by land and sea, quickly overwhelmed the meager 
resources of Asiland.  Moreover, when the tsunami hit, Asiland’s governance was 
already more in the hands of terrorist and guerilla/drug cartel organizations than 
Asiland’s elected representatives; this situation has degraded even more since. 
As waves of refugees streamed south, they came to realize that real help 
and assistance was in the neighboring country of Bartola, whose intact 
infrastructure and strong western ties made it the natural springboard for relief 
efforts.  Within days the guerillas and other terrorist factions in and around 
Asiland began to take advantage of the situation by migrating their operations to 
Bartola.  These groups openly robbed relief sites and workers, raped and 
murdered refugees gathered along the coast, and accosted local and 
international shipping. 
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The United States was invited by the Bartola government to provide 
humanitarian and disaster relief assistance to Bartola and the organizations 
operating within it.  ESG-7 based around the USS ESSEX was dispatched to the 
region to assume these tasks. 
ESG-7 arrived three days ago.  The vessels of the ESG have spent that 
time positioning themselves in the waters around Bartola and Asiland and slowly 
developing operational picture for both the land and sea situations.  Major sea 
and air lanes were identified, as well s several major ports, villages, and cities.  
The ESG then placed forces where they would best support what the ESG staff 
believed were their upcoming land and sea operations. 
A day after the arrival of ESG-7 Bartola officials reported a large uprising 
in the southwest area of Bartola.  Insurgents, now supported by groups from 
Asiland have begun to wrest control of the area from Bartola’s forces.  Bartola’s 
military units shifted to the southwest to counter, but this merely led to a total loss 
of control of the refugee situation along the northern border.  Intelligence 
suggests that terrorist or cartel forces, supported by dissident groups in Bartola 
and Asiland, may be making a concerted effort to wrest control of the 
government.  It was also reported that several oil tankers and cargo ships were 
accosted by local pirates.  The government of Bartola has requested United 
States forces to assist them in putting down the insurgency in the southwest.  
The United States has agreed, and has deployed the bulk of 31st MEU forces to 
support Bartola’s counterinsurgency actions. 
Bartola’s military patrols are overwhelmed with tracking and locating the 
large numbers of refugee boats, as well as locating the terrorist and cartel 
operatives using refugee boats for illegal transfers.  Furthermore, Bartola 
intelligence shared information that several coastal defense missile launch sites 
once located in Asiland are missing.  Bartola intelligence believes that some of 
these launchers may have been moved to new locations, possibly, Haven Island.  
There is also a strong possibility that Haven Island is being used as a pirate base 
for local terrorist and insurgent groups.  Bartola has requested the assistance of 
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the United States and in assisting with the situation at sea. The neighboring 
country to the east, Cathal, has neither resources nor the political/military will to 
become involved or assist in the current situation. 
4. Emergent Tasks  
Emergent tasks are items that require immediate action.  These tasks are 
sent via e-mail from higher authority to decision makers and include the 
following:  Coastal Defense Missile Launchers (CDLs), SAM sites and ISR 
mapping.  Descriptions of each can be seen in tasks description. 
5. Tasks 
Tasks are items that require the use of assets to measure their attributes.  
Depending on the value of all the attributes of a task, will determine the 
appropriate action for the decision maker to take.  There are fourteen tasks in 
Experiment 11. 
At Sea Search and Rescue (SOS) are time critical events that must be 
dealt with immediately to avoid political, other public relations repercussions or 
the loss of lives.  This is normally a result of a ship having been attacked or 
having hit a mine. 
 Buildings (GBLDG) are located along major roads and have the 
potential to serve as basing stations by terrorists and insurgents.  These require 
ongoing monitoring. 
Coastal Defense Missile Launchers (CDL) that have been pirated pose 
a threat to U.S. and international shipping in the region.  CDLs are not 
considered hostile until designated hostile by the ESG CDR.  If the ESG CDR 
obtains intel showing  CDLs to be used against shipping, the ESG CDR shall 
order them located and destroyed. 
Fishing Boats (FB) are vehicles that might transport refugees, terrorists 
and weapons.  These must be monitored for cargo and status (i.e., terrorists).   
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Fishing Villages (FV), which there are four located on Bartola, are the 
major points of departure and entry of refugees, terrorists/insurgents (mingled 
within the refugees) and weapons through the use of the large local fishing fleet.   
Ground Search and Rescue (GS&R) are time critical events that must be 
dealt with immediately to avoid political, other public relations repercussions or 
the loss of lives.   
ISR Requests are pop-up requests from higher authority to conduct a 
time critical mapping at a specified location.   
Merchant Vessels travel the known sea lanes carrying cargo to multiple 
international destinations.  Several merchants deliver relief supplies and 
unfortunately smuggle weapons to terrorist groups in the country.  
Military Ground Patrol (GMGP) are vast and active throughout Bartola.  
Insurgents and bandits are also moving about the country and may pose as 
ground patrol. 
Oil Tankers transit the sea lanes going to and from oil platforms near 
Cathal.  They are potential targets for terrorist attacks and need to be protected. 
Patrol Crafts are utilized by Asiland, Bartola and Cathal.  All patrol crafts 
are subject to being commandeered by terrorists/insurgents, who can use them 
to do things such as attack merchant vessels or oil tankers.   
Refugee Camps, which there are four located in Bartola.  They are the 
location of the greatest relief works being conducted and the ultimate destination 
of all refugees in the country.  There are several of these spread over the 
countries and islands.   
SAM Sites (GSAM).  All countries in the region have agreed to deactivate 
their SAM sites while the U.S. is conducting humanitarian operations.  A few 
mobile sites have been reported stolen and have been commandeered by 
terrorists. 
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Truck Convoys transit throughout Bartola to deliver relief supplies and 
food shipments to refugee camps and fishing villages. 
The overall task of the ISR Commander, ISR Coord, SCC and MEU is to 
measure each attribute of a task and take action according to ZIPPOs.  For 
example, the building task.  Buildings have attributes of activity and temperament 
that require measurement.  If the activity of a building is suspicious and the 
temperament is hostile, then the action is to strike the building with an AV8 or an 
AH1.  If tasks are not completed, it spawns something else to occur.  It is 
important for decision makers to measure all attributes of a task and take 
appropriate action immediately.   
6. Building the Scenario 
The goal of Experiment 11 was to determine an effective ISR 
management structure at the operational level of conflict. It was intended to 
evaluate how planning could be inserted in the series of simulation events.  This 
latter aspect of the research is in preparation for future A2C2 work with Maritime 
Headquarters with Maritime Operations Center (MHQ with MOC), which is going 
to be the new focus for Adaptive Architecture for Command and Control (A2C2) 
experimentation.   
The scenario design modified the Experiment 10 scenario to support the 
Experiment 11 research goals.  This experiment used the same geopolitical 
background, but utilized slightly different management structures, incorporated 
planning amongst the decision makers and reduced the assets.  This created a 
larger requirement for asset allocation and coordination. 
Researchers spent over 600 hours combined conducting telephone 
conferences, meetings, DDD training/familiarization and document 
review/revision.  They decided on utilizing two management structures:  
Condition I, which is made up of an ISR Coord, an SCC and a MEU and 
Condition II, which is made up of an ISR Cdr, an SCC and a MEU.  Some of the 
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findings reported by Kennedy regarding Experiment 10 along with the research 
goals of Experiment 11 led to the following scenario design challenges.  Each 
challenge below has a description of how it was resolved. 
1) Elimination of skepticism:  Researchers wanted to create military 
realism; but the experimental/simulation context requires that assets be 
somewhat abstracted.  Participant feedback from Experiment 10 indicated one of 
the problems was skepticism due to the pre-conceived capabilities of assets such 
as the UH-1 and SH-60.  This was resolved by creating the XH30, which is a 
conceptual (rather than real) advanced multi-purpose helicopter that combines 
the capabilities of an SH60 and UH-1, and are deployable for both sea and 
ground missions.  Another way of eliminating skepticism was by providing asset 
acronyms to each player which provided a brief description of each asset. 
2) Determining what assets should be lost:  Researchers played multiple 
scenarios, utilizing different combinations of asset reductions.  This was done to 
determine if it was feasible to lose those assets and still perform assigned tasks 
without players being overwhelmed.  In selecting the assets to remove, 
researchers wanted to ensure decision makers still had assets to provide 
assistance in performing task measurements for each other’s tasks.  Using input 
from A2C2 modelers at the University of Connecticut, the ultimate combination of 
asset reduction was two RECC, one XH-30, one RHIB and one UAV.   
3) Simplifying assets:  Assets were combined to reduce the nomenclature 
and the amount of different assets that had similar measurement capabilities.  
The UH-1 and SH-60 was combined into the XH-30 and the SOF was combined 
with RECC. 
4) Measurement range:  Some ranges for asset measurement capability 
were changed for ease of manipulation on the display screens.  The MSPF 
measuring capability was increased from three miles to five miles, RECC 
increased from three miles to five miles and the RHIB increased from three miles 
to five miles.  
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5) To eliminate confusion of what tasks to pursue, researchers removed 
the tasks of airfields and medical facilities.  This reduced the clutter on the screen 
and prevented feeling the need to measure the tasks not part of the current 
scenario. 
6) Reduction of message traffic:  Spawned messages and regular 
messages were reviewed and revised to be more specific and utilize proper 
military jargon. 
7) The help button for each task was updated with information about what 
attributes were required to be measured.  This provided a quick alternative to  
having to look at the measuring task attribute sheet.  
8) Assessment rates, revisit rates and re-assessment rates were captured   
by performance “monitors” throughout the data collection as a way to determine if 
tasks are completed or if measurements were conducted at  prescribed times.  
One of the research questions being addressed was:  Does the 
management structure (ISR Coordinator vs. ISR Commander) affect the degree 
to which decision makers focus on their “local” goals or encourage  
communication and cooperation amongst decision makers (i.e., supporting 
relationships)?  This question led to the following aspects of the experimental 
design:     
1) Determination of  roles and responsibilities.  Roles were determined 
to be that of the ISR Cdr, ISR Coord, SCC and MEU.  Responsibilities were 
established as ISR’s supported the SCC and MEU.  SCC was overall 
responsible for sea tasks and MEU was overall responsible for land tasks.  It 
was determined that although each decision maker has an overall 
responsibility, coordinated effort was required to successfully complete all 
tasks. 
2) Reduction of assets.  Once assets were reduced it required increased 
coordination amongst decision makers.   
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3) The incorporation of planning.  By incorporating planning and re-
planning, it allowed decision makers to maintain situational awareness and 
ensure they were attentive to ways in which they could support each other in task 
accomplishment. 
7. Assets and Sensor Capabilities 
The assets in Experiment 11 were organized as seen in Table 2. 
 
ESG SCC MEU 
Asset Amount Asset Amount Location Asset Amount Location 
UAV 4 RHIB 1 DDG AV8B 1 LHA 
  RHIB 1 CG AH1 1 LHA 
  XH30 2 FFG XH30 2 LHA 
  LCU 1 FFG MSPF 1 LSD 
  LCAC 2 LSD MSPF 1 LPD 
  HH60 2 LHA RECC 4 FOB Bartola 
Table 2.   Asset Organization 
Depending on the ISR management structure, the four Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAV) were either owned by the ISR Commander or owned two each by 
the SCC and MEU.  UAV is an aircraft with no onboard pilot. UAVs can be 
remote controlled or fly autonomously based on pre-programmed flight plans or 
more complex dynamic automation systems.  In the DDD UAVs are capable of 
and measuring specific attributes from ranges of 12 and 15 miles.       
Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB) is a light-weight but high performance 
and high capacity boat constructed with a solid, shaped hull and flexible tubes at 
the gunwale.  The inflatable collar means that buoyancy is not lost if a large 
quantity of water is shipped aboard.  The design is stable and seaworthy and is 




XH30s are conceptual/advanced multi-purpose helicopters that combine 
the capabilities of an SH60 and UH-1 and are deployable for both sea and 
ground missions.  In the scenario software, XH30s can measure specific 
attributes at four and ten miles. 
Landing Craft Utility (LCUs) have no attribute measuring capabilities and 
are used by amphibious forces to transport equipment and troops to the shore.  
They are capable of transporting tracked or wheeled vehicles and troops from 
amphibious assault ships to beachheads or piers.   
Landing Craft Air Cushioned (LCACs) are transports, ship-to-shore and 
across the beach, personnel, weapons, equipment and cargo of the assault 
elements of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force.  LCACs do not have attribute 
measuring capabilities. 
HH60s are helicopters with medium-range search and rescue (SAR), drug 
interdiction, cargo lift, special operations and significant ISR capabilities.   HH60s 
have specific attribute measuring capabilities of four and six miles in DDD.   
AV-8 is a Light Attack Aircraft (Harrier).  Its primary mission is to provide 
responsive close air support for the ground forces.  This single-piloted, advanced 
vertical/short takeoff and landing aircraft can operate from short fields, forward 
sites, roads and surface ships providing minimum response time to targets.  It 
has no attribute measuring capabilities. 
AH-1 is a Cobra Helicopter Gunship with a primary mission of attack and 
close support.  The AH-1 has no attribute measuring capabilities. 
Maritime Special Purpose Force (MSPF) is a task-organized force formed 
from elements of a Marine Expeditionary Unit and naval special warfare forces 
that can be quickly tailored to a specific mission. The maritime special purpose 
force can execute on short notice a wide variety of missions in a supporting, 
supported or unilateral role.  In the scenario software, the MSPF is capable of 
measuring specific attributes from a range of five miles. 
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Reconnaissance (RECC) teams are highly trained military units designed 
to conduct specialized operations such as reconnaissance, unconventional 
warfare and counter-terrorism actions.  RECCs are capable of measuring specific 
attributes at a range of 4 miles in DDD. 
Guided Missile Cruiser (CG) is a large combat vessel with multiple target 
response capability. They perform primarily in a battle force role and are multi-
mission surface combatants capable of supporting carrier strike groups, 
amphibious forces, or of operating independently and as flagships of surface 
action groups. 
Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG) is a fast warship that helps safeguard 
larger ships by operating in support of carrier strike groups, surface action 
groups, amphibious groups and replenishment groups. DDGs are multi-mission 
surface combatants which are also able to provide naval gun fire support. 
Guided Missile Frigate (FFG) is an anti-submarine warfare combatant with 
an additional anti-air warfare capability. 
Landing Platform Dock (LPD) embarks, transports and lands elements of 
a landing force for expeditionary warfare missions. 
Landing Ship Dock (LSD), transports and launches amphibious crafts and 
vehicles with their crews and embarked personnel. They are mainly used to carry 
 Landing Craft Air Cushions (LCACs), as well Marines. 
Amphibious Helo Assault Ship (LHA) is employed to land and support 
ground forces on enemy territory by an amphibious assault. 
In the DDD software, ships may be utilized for measuring specific 
attributes from two miles away.  Although ships have that capability, it is not 
recommended due to their extremely slow speeds.  The primary assets for 
detection are UAVs, XH30s, HH60s, AV8s and AH1s.   
Workload intensity of decision makers, range and location of tasks, 
restricted capabilities of assets and requirements of assets according to ZIPPOs 
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prompt decision makers to request assistance from one another.  The 
redundancy of asset capabilities provided decision makers the ability to 
coordinate and support each other in successfully accomplishing task 
measurements and completing required actions in accordance with the ZIPPOs.  
Players utilized the Asset Capability for Measuring Task Attributes sheet, which 
displays each player’s asset capabilities and limitations.  Table 3 below displays 



































































































                                  
UAV 15 15   15     15   15     12   12   12 
                                  
MSPF                     5 5 5 5 5 5 
RECC 4   4   4 4   4 4 4             
XH30 4 4   4     4   4 4 10   10   10 10 
                                  
HH60 4   4   4 4   4 4 4 6   6   6 6 
XH30 4 4   4     4   4 4 10   10   10 10 
RHIB                     5 5 5 5 5 5 
Ships                     2   2   2 2 
 




Table 3.   Asset Capability for Measuring Task Attributes 
 
Tasks may also be considered as missions.  The tasks that require 
measurements in Experiment 11 are fishing villages, refugee camps, buildings, 
truck convoys, ground patrols, fishing boats, oil tankers, merchant vessels and 
patrol crafts.  Attributes (marked “A” in Table 3) are items that must be 
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measured.  Tasks may have different attributes and are denoted as A1, A2 or A3.    
The attributes measured in Experiment 11 are refugees, weapons, crowd, 
temperament, activity, cargo, country and status. 
 Assets that are capable of measuring attributes in Experiment 11 are 
located on the far left column of the above table.  Those assets are UAVs, 
MSPFs, RECCs, XH30s, HH60s, RHIBs and ships (FFG, DDG, CG, LSD, LPD 
and LHA).   
The numbers located to the right of the assets and below the attributes are 
the ranges in miles the assets are able to measure a specific task attribute.  For 
example:  The task Fishing Village has an attribute (A3) of Crowd that can be 
measured by MEUs asset RECC at a range of four miles and measured by SCCs 
asset HH60 at a range of four miles. 
8. Roles and Responsibilities 
It is important to define the roles and responsibilities of the decision 
makers because these roles are tied to the experimental conditions.  Defining 
roles and responsibilities reduces the amount of confusion and misallocation of 
assets, allowing for more effective use of assets. 
The MEU is overall responsible for land operations.  This includes the 
following:  1) maintaining situational awareness of buildings, fishing villages, 
military ground patrols, refugee camps and truck convoys; 2) locate ground 
search and rescue and conduct rescue; 3) respond to external ISR tasking; 4) 
eliminate hostile CDLs and SAMs; and 5) coordinate with SCC and ISRC 6) take 
action according to ZIPPOs. 
The SCC is overall responsible for maritime operations.  This includes the 
following:  1) maintain situational awareness of fishing boats, merchant vessels, 
oil tankers and patrol crafts; 2) conduct any at sea search and rescue; 3) respond 
to external ISR tasking; 4) coordinate with MEU and ISRC; and 5) take action 
according to ZIPPOs.     
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The ISR Commander takes an active role in controlling high-value ISR 
assets (UAVs), conducts ISR taskings from higher authority, coordinates with 
SCC and MEU, monitors e-mail and intelligence messages and strives for 
efficiency in the use of ISR assets. 
The ISR Coord takes an active role in de-conflicting high demand low 
density assets, monitoring tasks to assure periodic updates and assessments are 
current, coordinating with SCC and MEU, monitoring e-mail and intelligence 
messages and striving for efficiency in the use of ISR assets, but does not own 
any ISR assets.   
Although the MEU, SCC, ISR Commander and ISR Coord each have an 
overall responsibility, the key in accomplishing tasks successfully is coordinated 
effort  (Appendices B and C). 
9. ZIPPOs 
Each decision maker was given a copy of all thirteen ZIPPOs to utilize 
during the experiment.  Due to the high op-tempo of the scenario, they were 
designed to provide decision makers with a quick reference guide with pictures of 
what action to take based on the assessment of task attributes.  During the 
preparation and trial period of Experiment 11 by the researchers, it was 
concluded that providing pictures would enable faster action than providing only 
words.  ZIPPOs are to be utilized in conjunction with the Asset Capability for 
Measuring Task Attributes sheet.    
Because each task has its own requirements, there were thirteen ZIPPOs 
to support thirteen of fourteen tasks of the SCC and MEU combined.  There was 
no ZIPPO for the ISR task.  The five tasks for the SCC were as follow:  1) fishing 
boat 2) merchant vessel 3) oil tanker 4) patrol craft 5) at sea search and rescue 
(SOS).  The eight tasks for the MEU were as follow:  1) building 2) coastal 
defense missile launcher (CDL) 3) fishing village 4) military ground patrol 5) 
ground search and rescue (GS&R) 6) refugee camp 7) SAM site (GSAM) 8) truck 
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convoy.  Each ZIPPO provided the following if required:  1) measurement rates 
2) reassessment rates 3) location methods 4) illumination maintenance 5) 
assessment rates 6) revisit rates.  The ZIPPOs also provides the action to take 
depending on what the measurement of the task attribute was.  
By providing decision makers with all ZIPPOs, not just those in their area 
of overall responsibility, it allowed them the opportunity to see what each 
decision maker’s responsibilities were and where they might be able to request 
assistance or provide support to other players.  This reduced any confusion of 
responsibilities, allowed for easier coordinated effort and improved the 
experiment data collection (Appendix H). 
G. PARTICIPANTS 
The participants in this experiment are multi-service members with various 
job specialty backgrounds, different experiences and different amount of years of 
service.  Each participant was required to complete demographic survey, which 
provided background information on each participant.  Participants represented 
Navy, Marine Corps and Army with various occupational backgrounds such as: 
Surface Warfare; Communications; and Field Artillery.  Ranks of participants 
ranged from O1 thru O5.  The majority of the participants were O3.       
The teams were broken into seven teams of three:  A, B, C, D, E, F and G.  
They were further broken down into the two conditions.  Teams A, C, E and G 
are at Condition II, which is comprised of an ISR Commander, SCC and a MEU.  
Teams B, D and F are at Condition I, which is comprised of an ISR Coord, SCC 
and a MEU.  Once students were assigned teams, they were able to decide 
amongst themselves which role they would take on.  Researchers recommended 
that the person most adept at video games assume the responsibility of MEU. 
H. TOOLS OF THE EXPERIMENT 
All tools of the experiment were pilot-tested by the A2C2 research team 
and revised a appropriate prior to conducting Experiment 11.  DDD v3 was the 
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primary tool in conducting the experiment.  DDD provided Experiment 11 
researchers with experimental control to include defining management 
structures, accessing information, controlling amount and types of assets, 
establishing task parameters and controlling the tempo of the scenario.   
A large screen display was utilized to display the operational picture 
players see on their screen.  This was helpful during the training and planning 
stages of the experiment. 
One master binder was created to house paper documents tailored for 
Experiment 11.  The master binder was kept on a central table that was 
accessible to players and researchers.  The central table is also the location for 
players to communicate prior to commencing the experiment and during the 
planning phase.  The master binder contained the following:  Experiment 11 
A2C2 Brief; Operation Ensuring Hope; DDD Legend; AOR; Asset Acronyms; 
Asset Capability for Measuring Task Attributes (Measuring Task Attributes); SCC 
Zippos (fishing boat, merchant vessel, oil tanker, patrol craft, at sea search and 
rescue);MEU ZIPPOs (building, coastal defense missile launcher, fishing village, 
military ground patrol, ground search and rescue, refugee camp, SAM site, truck 
convoy); Task Description; Planning Sheets (surface, ground, ISR CDR and 
AOR); and Monitoring Sheets.  All of these materials can be found in Appendices 
A, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J and K. 
Five player binders were created.  One for each of the three players to 
maintain at their own workstation and two extras to be utilized by researchers 
and monitors if needed.  ZIPPOs are quick reference guides with pictures for 
players to determine what action to take based on the assessment of task 
attributes.  The player binder contained the following:  Measuring Task Attributes; 
SCC ZIPPOs; and MEU ZIPPOs (see Appendices G and H). 
Student brief folders were given to participants at the initial brief one week 
prior to the experiment.  The student brief folder contained the following: 
Experiment 11 A2C2 Brief; Legend; AOR; Asset Acronyms; Operation Ensuring 
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Hope; Measuring Task Attribute; Fishing Boat ZIPPO; and Task Description (see 
Appendices A, D, E, F, C, G, H and I).  The documents in the folder assisted 
participants in performing the experiment more effectively. 
The Experiment 11 A2C2 Brief was provided to give participants an 
understanding of what the experiment was about to include  the geopolitical 
situation, status of countries involved, area of responsibility, different 
management structures, responsibilities of each decision maker, organization of 
forces (assets and their locations), utilization of the Asset Capability for 
Measuring Task Attributes sheet and utilization of ZIPPOs.  Operation Ensuring 
Hope provided a more in depth explanation of the geopolitical situation.  The 
DDD Legend provided an icon associated with each task as it appeared on the 
video screen.  AOR was provided and defined to ensure participants understood 
their focus area to eliminate their use of assets in non-required areas.  The Asset 
Acronyms document provided the multi-service participants with what the 
acronyms stood for and a brief description of the capabilities of each asset.  The 
Measuring Task Attribute sheet displays each decision maker’s asset ownership, 
capabilities and limitations.  ZIPPOs provided decision makers with a quick step 
by step reference guide on what action to take depending on attribute 
measurements.  The Task Description document provided a written detailed 
description of each ZIPPO.  The Planning Sheets were provided to utilize during 
the planning stage.  Each team was provided a planning sheet to be completed 
by each decision maker (ground, sea and ISR).  A blue pen was utilized for sea, 
green for ground and purple for ISR for planning purposes.  A red pen was used 
by the team to conduct re-planning to be able to differentiate form the initial plan.  
Monitoring Sheets were utilized by monitors to collect task measurement times to 
determine if decision makers were conducting measurements within the 
prescribed times.  This was captured after 15 minutes, 30 minutes and 45 
minutes of play.  The DDD Training Pointer sheet provided researchers with a 
standard guideline to conduct training on buttonology.   
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I. EXPERIMENTATION AND DATA COLLECTION 
By collecting tape recordings, simulation recordings, log history files and 
paper assessments during the experiment, researchers are able to conduct 
future data analysis.  Paper assessments utilized can be seen in the appendices, 
chapter VI. 
1. Tape Recordings 
The NPS research team utilized 90 minute tapes and recorded 
approximately three and a half hours of data per team.  Back-up recording was 
conducted on a portable recorder by professors from the University of San Diego, 
who were gathering eye tracking data.  Recordings were conducted to capture 
the communication and coordination amongst team members to get insight into 
each team’s performance.  Coding was conducted real-time on all experiments 
prior to Experiment 11.  Due to the limited number of researchers, it was not 
feasible to conduct real-time coding.  However, the data collected from 
Experiment 11 will be utilized for future coding.   
2. Simulation Recordings 
Simulation recordings come from utilizing the DDD.  They are recordings 
of the actions that each player takes during the scenario.  Simulation recordings 
can be utilized for review, playback and/or analysis.  By reviewing the recordings 
researchers are able to determine items such as latency, accomplishment of 
tasks and   average time between measurements. 
3. Log History Files 
Log history files provide the actions of each decision maker.  It provides 
the time a measurement was made, what asset is utilized and the task number.  
These file may be utilized for review and future analysis.  Data from the log 
history files were reviewed for relevance and converted into an excel 
spreadsheet to allow for ease of data analysis .  Data were then organized to 
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represent each team (A thru G) and each group (ISR Commander/Coord) for 
each of the test data categories. An ANOVA was then computed for each group 
to determine the differences in variances between the two ISR Officer roles.  
4. Demographic Survey 
The Demographic Survey is a collection of the participants experience 
background.   
5. Workload (TLX) Questionnaire 
The NASA Task Load Index is a multi-dimensional rating procedure that 
provides an overall workload score based on a weighted average of ratings on 
six subscales: Mental Demands; Physical Demands; Temporal Demands; Own 




Figure 1.   Workload (TLX) Questionnaire Subscales 
6. Teamwork Assessment:  Observer Rating Form 
The Teamwork Assessment allowed researchers to rate team 
performances in five areas.  This enabled the two management structures to be 
compared to determine which structure works more efficiently.  The five areas of 
performance are: 
1) Communication Behavior.  Involves the proper exchange of information 
between two or more team members. 
 2) Monitoring Behavior.  Observation of team member’s performance. 
3) Back-up Behavior.  Involves how team members assist each other. 
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4) Coordination Behavior.  Involves how well team members work with 
each other to accomplish mission. 
5) Team Orientation.  Refers to how in sync team members are in mission  
goals. 
7. A2C2 ESG Post-Experiment Survey 
The post-experiment survey is a self assessment.  This assists in 
improving the planning process and enables the research group to see how the 
participants evaluate their performance in both planning and implementation.  
Utilizing this survey also bridges the planning process for future planning 
processes such as the MHQ/MOC. 
8. Survey Analysis  
Analysis of Workload (TLX) Questionnaires, Teamwork Surveys and Post-
Experiment Surveys were analyzed to determine if there was any correlation 
between how the teams worked together and the latencies for emergent tasks.  
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IV. EXPERIMENT RESULTS 
A. OVERVIEW 
 Experiment 11 of the A2C2 program provided an abundance of data for 
analysis. Due to the large volume of data produced, only the most critical portion 
of this data was analyzed in this thesis. The primary data analyzed here are the 
time (latencies) for each team in detecting, measuring and revisiting tasks 
assigned to them. The team data were then organized into two groups, C1 (ISR 
Coordinator) and C2 (ISR Commander), each representing a different level of the 
independent variable. An analysis was conducted with the group data in order to 
establish which level of the independent variable proved more efficient in the 
planned ISR mission tasks. Another analysis was conducted on the two levels of 
the independent variable using the data for the “emergent” tasks. These tasks 
popped-up or “emerged” via e-mail and were included as a way of measuring the 
teams’ reactions to unanticipated conditions.  
Data were also collected using written artifacts collected during 
Experiment 11. Workload Task Load Index (TLX) questionnaires, Teamwork 
Surveys, and Post Experiment Assessment forms were filled out by the 
participants and the observers in order to gain a better understanding of how 
these teams worked together. Finally, a preliminary look was taken using the 
planning sheets from each team to determine any correlation between teams that 
adapted their plans and the efficiency of those teams according to latencies for 
measuring and revisiting tasks.  
B. MODEL VERIFICATION 
After many dry runs of the Experiment 10 scenario with A2C2 
investigators, changes were made to the Experiment 11 scenario. These 
changes included the removal of assets in order to make the differences between 
the two command structures more distinguishable. The play time was also 
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modified from past experiments in order to add a certain amount of time pressure 
to the teams. The most pronounced modification in this experiment was the 
incorporation of operational planning designed to give participants more of a real 
world feel and mimic the MHQ/MOC planning cell. 
C. EXPECTED RESULTS 
Experiment 11 was intended to demonstrate measurable differences in the 
efficiencies of the two command structures under study. The intuitive motivation 
for this work was that one structure would induce more communication, 
collaboration, and cooperation than the other. The two levels of the independent 
variable were intended to highlight these differences; ISR Coordinator (C1), and 
ISR Commander (C2).  
The ISR Coordinator group was designed to mimic a unit whose high 
value ISR assets are coordinated with the assistance of an ISR Coordinator. This 
coordinator does not own any assets and her input is considered wise guidance 
rather than hard orders. If a situation arises where the ISR coordinator receives a 
task that she considers a higher priority than what is being accomplished at the 
time, the coordinator can communicate this concern to the participants and they 
may respond immediately, or complete their ongoing tasks and move on to the 
new task, or completely ignore the Coordinator’s suggestion and continue with 
their plan. Emergent tasks in the scenario were used to observe these choices 
among the experimental team. 
The ISR Commander structure was designed to mimic a unit whose ISR 
assets are controlled by an ISR Commander. The commander owns the 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) assets and has the authority to use them as she 
sees fit. It was expected that this command structure would induce a more 
directive style of planning and utilization of assets. The emergent tasks were also 
used here to observe this behavior in the experimental teams. 
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D. ACTUAL RESULTS 
We focus our analysis on the latencies between arrival and detection, 
detection and first measurement, and first measurement and subsequent 
measurements of tasks assigned both by team and by group. The Workload 
questionnaires, Teamwork surveys, and Post Experiment surveys were also 
analyzed to observe any correlation between perceived team efficiencies and the 
latencies for emergent tasks. Finally, we will examine the team planning 
documents for correlations between the number of changes made to plans and 
ultimate performance as measured by task latencies. 
Using the log history files of the DDD, the data were scrubbed for those 
data of interest to this study, and then converted into Excel spreadsheet format in 
order to better manipulate and analyze the data. The data were then organized 
into mean times for each team for each of the test data categories then 
reorganized into two groups each representing one of the command structures. 
To examine the between and within group variances, an ANOVA was computed 
for the group data. Group C1 represented the ISR Coordinator structure (teams 
B, D, and F). Group C2 represented the ISR Commander structure (teams A, C, 
E, and G). It would be reasonable to conclude that if the differences in variances 
between the groups were greater than the difference in variance between the 
teams, the imposed structure (Commander versus Coordinator) induced or 
inhibited certain efficiencies in team performance.  
A single factor ANOVA for the latency in arrival and detection of tasks 
indicated a significant difference between C1 and C2, with a p value of 0.12.  The 
value in the average category is the actual mean latency in seconds for 43 tasks 
(see Figure 2). The lower mean for C2 suggests lower (more efficient) latency in 






Factor       
       
SUMMARY       
Groups Count Sum Average Variance   
C1 (ISR Coord) 3 835.853 278.6177 231.3906   
C2 (ISR Cdr) 4 1008.507 252.1268 407.0075   
       
       
ANOVA       
Source of 
Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 1203.032 1 1203.032 3.572364 0.11735 6.607891
Within Groups 1683.804 5 336.7608    
       
Total 2886.836 6         
Figure 2.   Single Factor ANOVA for the Latency in Arrival and Detection of Tasks 
 
More detailed ANOVAs were computed for latencies between detection 
and first measurement, first measurement and tasks requiring subsequent 
measurements every 20 min, and first measurement and tasks requiring 
subsequent measurements every 15 minutes. These more granular analyses 
showed less significant differences between the two structures.  
The measurements taken of latencies between detection, first 
measurement and subsequent measurements by the teams are compiled into 
group data and arranged in Figure 2.  Of significance in these analyses, the 15 
minute subsequent measurement tasks showed that the Coordinator (C1) 
structure had a lower latency than Commander (C2) structure. 
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MEAN LATENCIES FOR ARR/DET, DET/MEAS, SUBSEQUENT 


















Figure 3.   Mean Latency Data 
 
The latency data for the emergent tasks showed less significant 
differences (p=0.33) between C1 and C2 than the overall arrival and detection of 
tasks, though given the premise of the experiment these are still interesting 
results bearing further study. In particular, it is interesting to note that the mean 
latencies for each structure showed  a large difference for Task 242 where the 
ISR Commander completed the task in a shorter amount of time, and in Task 346 
where the ISR Commander completed the task in a longer amount of time. These 
differences are attributed to individual team performance and not to any factor 
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242 207 9 n.s. 
244 47 12.25 n.s. 
250 28.33 80 n.s. 
346 26.33 487.75 n.s. 
Note: Latency in 
seconds     n.s. 
Table 4.   Mean Latencies for Emergent Tasks 
E. PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION DATA 
The written documentation analyzed here consisted of Workload Task 
Load Index (TLX) questionnaires, Teamwork surveys, and Post Experiment 
surveys that were filled out by the participants. The participants were asked to 
judge their experience during the experiment in certain categories. The Workload 
questionnaire consisted of Mental Demand, Physical Demand, Temporal 
Demand, Performance, Effort, and Frustration categories that the participants 
were asked to judge on a scale from 0 to 10 with 0 being low and 10 being high. 
These data were collected, organized into team and group categories, means 
were computed for each team, for each group (Coordinator and Commander), 
and for each of the test categories. ANOVAs were computed to compare the two 
structures in each of the test categories and with all the categories as a whole. 
Although the ANOVA findings were non-significant, the means were interesting to 
observe as most ratings were close together with the biggest difference being in 















MENTAL DEMAND 6.92 7.02 n.s. 
PHYSICAL DEMAND 1.97 2.81 n.s. 
TEMPORAL DEMAND 6.53 5.94 n.s. 
PERFORMANCE 7.31 7.46 n.s. 
EFFORT 6.86 6.52 n.s. 
FRUSTRATION 4.53 4.77 n.s. 
Note: Means based on a rating scale 0=Low 
and 10=High       
Table 5.   Two Structure Workload Ratings 
 
The Teamwork surveys consisted of Communication Behavior, Monitoring 
Behavior, Back-up Behavior, Coordination Behavior, and Team Orientation 
categories. The participants were asked to judge their teams on a scale of 1 to 7 
with 1 being poor and 7 being good. The Teamwork survey data were also 
gathered and organized in the same fashion as the Workload questionnaires and 
the same computations were conducted on these data. The ANOVA did not 
render any significant findings, but interestingly there were no great differences in 
the means in Table 6.  
 
Teamwork Ratings Comparing the Two 








Communication Behavior 5.67 5.67 n.s. 
Monitoring Behavior 6 5.67 n.s. 
Back-up Behavior 5.44 5.33 n.s. 
Coordination Behavior 5.57 5.67 n.s. 
Team Orientation 5.89 5.83 n.s. 
Note: Ratings based on a scale of 1=Low 
and 7=Excellent       
Table 6.    Teamwork Ratings 
 
The Post Experiment surveys consisted of several questions designed to 
measure the extent of how effective the participants considered their plans to be.  
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The participants were asked to answer these questions on a scale of 1 to 7, 1 
being not at all and 7 extremely effective. This data was also organized and 
analyzed in the same manner as the other two written documents. The ANOVAs 
also rendered non significance and the questions and means are in Table 7. 
 








How effective was your team’s original plan? 5.33 5.5 n.s. 
How effective was your team’s planning process? 5.56 5.92 n.s. 
How effective were you in being able to re-plan? 6 5.92 n.s. 
How effective were you in being able to implement 
the plan you developed? 5.22 5.58 n.s. 
What is your overall assessment of your team’s 
performance? 5.56 5.92 n.s. 
 How well did the team as a whole act in support 
of others?  5.78 5.92 n.s. 
Note: Ratings based on a scale 1=not at all 
7=extremely effective     n.s. 
Table 7.   Post Experiment Ratings 
 
The preliminary look at the planning sheets showed that team A did not 
make any changes to their plan, team B made 14 changes, team C made 8 
changes, team D made 9 changes, team E made 10 changes, team F made 8 
changes, and team G made 11 changes. These data were organized into team 
categories, then group category, means were computed and an ANOVA was 
computed for the two command structures. The results were an F value of 0.85, 
a p value of 0.397, and an F crit. of 6.607. This suggests only weak differences 
between the Coordinator and Commander structures.   There seems to be no 
correlation between the amount of re-planning and quality of performance. 
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F. CONCLUSIONS 
The results from Experiment 11 suggest weak differences between the 
two imposed command structures. Further detailed analyses of these data are 
needed in order to draw more concrete conclusions as to the relationship 
between operational planning and team efficiency. These results may be 
attributed to any number of factors. When conducting human-in-the-loop 
experiments controls are often difficult to enforce. Teams were established with 
the intent to randomize groups with respect to experience and years of military 
service, but these are difficult variables to measure. Any experience the 
participants had in working as team (in other class work) may have dampened 
emergent behaviors due to the command structures. The players in the ISR 
Commander role might not have had enough experience in command in order to 
assert as directive an approach as was expected.  Another factor could be that 
the participants had pre-conceived notions as to the expected outcome of the 
experiment and these notions could have guided their actions. An example of this 
is players focusing on completing their own tasks prior to providing assistance to 
other players.   
There also exist many different methods in which to analyze the data.  In 
Two Types of ISR Commands under Two Different Mission Intensities: 
Examining ESG Concepts (Entin et al., 2008) data from A2C2 Experiment 10 
were examined with a slightly different methodology. Specifically, three structures 
and two different mission intensities were studied with respect to task accuracy. 
Experiment 10 scenarios contained more ISR assets to accomplish the tasks 
required and the time of play was slightly different than Experiment 11. Their 
analysis of Experiment 10 data clearly shows a marked advantage for the ISR 
Commander structure during times of low intensity with respect to task accuracy 
(Entin et al., 2008). Those results, coupled with this thesis, suggest further 
experimentation is warranted. 
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The Adaptive Architecture for Command and Control (A2C2) Experiment 
11 investigated the team efficiencies completing intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) tasks under two different command and control structures.  
 The ISR Coordinator (C1) structure employs a team member (coordinator) who 
takes an active role in de-conflicting high demand low density assets, monitoring 
tasks to assure periodic updates and assessments are current, coordinating with 
SCC and MEU, monitoring e-mail and intelligence messages and striving for 
efficiency in the use of ISR assets, but does not own any ISR assets.  In the ISR 
Commander (C2) structure, a team member (commander) takes an active role in 
controlling high-value ISR assets (UAVs), conducts ISR taskings from higher 
authority, coordinates with SCC and MEU, monitors e-mail and intelligence 
messages and strives for efficiency in the use of ISR assets. Overall, the 
experiment employed 21 participants and four monitors. Participants were 
divided into seven teams of three each, spread across two different (C1, C2) 
groups.    
Experiment 11 also introduced a new variable into the game play, that of 
operational planning before and during the exercise. Participants were given 
briefs as to their missions and asset capabilities, and then were given the 
opportunity to plan a strategy to efficiently employ these assets. After 20 minutes 
of DDD game play, the exercise was paused. At this break, the participants 
received feedback on their effectiveness from monitors who had recorded 
whether required ISR assessments had occurred and at what latency.  They 
were then given the time to re-plan their strategy.  Play then continued for 
another 25 minutes. The intent of this planning process was to mimic operational 
level planning such as that done under the MHQ with MOC concept.  
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE EXPERIMENTS 
Largely weak differences were observed between the two command 
structures studied, though in general the C2 (ISR Commander) group seemed to 
demonstrate better task performance (lower latency). Task load worksheets and 
other participant artifacts seemed to indicate little difference between the 
command structures. 
The homogeneity of written responses, though, does suggest that future 
experiments could more radically alter task loading and command structure to 
make the experimental differences more apparent to players.  Another 
interpretation would be that this is not a situation of weak experimental power, 
but instead of a finding that having an ISR Coord adds significant value to the 
efficient use of ISR assets, to the point of “equal” performance with an ISR 
Commander who controls the high value ISR assets (UAVs). 
Further, the players often seemed to focus on the operation of the DDD 
rather than the big picture scenario. Future experiments could use personnel who 
are accustomed to operating computers as non-participants or confederates to 
the experiment to operate DDD for the participants.  
Another recommendation would be to employ personnel with some 
operational experience for participants (0-3 and 0-4), and only use personnel with 
some command experience as the commanders and coordinators (0-5 and 0-6). 
Failing that, the positions of ISR Commander and Coordinator could be scripted 
as to what decisions to make at what times. In this manner the factors of the 
independent variable may be drawn out and made more distinguishable. The 
planning process should certainly continue to be incorporated in future 
experiments. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
The DDD simulator has proved to be of great benefit in all of the A2C2 
experiments conducted in the past, and provided a wealth of data for analysis in 
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Experiment 11. Though the analyses of the written participant artifacts indicated 
little differences between the two command structures (C1, C2), the DDD data 
suggests more efficiency (shorter latency) for the ISR Coordinator (C1) in the 
category of 15 minute tasks. This in turn suggests that future experiments may 
be manipulated in such a way as to make the differences between the two 
command structures more distinguishable. By using the same written artifacts, 
experimenting with different scenario modifications, and continuing to incorporate 
operational planning, the A2C2 project may be able point the way towards the 
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APPENDIX C OPERATION ENSURING HOPE  
OPERATION ENSURING HOPE 
 
Time:        August 2011 
Location:  Off the coasts of Asiland and Bartola (deepwater sea) 
 
Geo-Political Situation  
 
Thirty days ago the country of Asiland was struck by a Tsunami that caused massive 
damage to the country’s infrastructure as well as incalculable losses to her civilian 
populace.  Following the tsunami, a lack of response from the Asiland government to the 
disaster has resulted in multitudes of Asiland citizens fleeing south looking for help and 
better conditions.  The southern exodus, which was both by land and sea, quickly 
overwhelmed the meager resources of Asiland.  Moreover, when the tsunami hit, 
Asiland’s governance was already more in the hands of terrorist and guerilla/drug cartel 
organizations than Asiland’s elected representatives; this situation has degraded even 
more since. 
 
As waves of refugees streamed south, they came to realize that real help and assistance 
was in the neighboring country of Bartola, whose intact infrastructure and strong western 
ties made it the natural springboard for relief efforts.  Within days the guerillas and other 
terrorist factions in and around Asiland began to take advantage of the situation by 
migrating their operations to Bartola.  These groups openly robbed relief sites and 
workers, raped and murdered refugees gathered along the coast, and accosted local and 
international shipping. 
 
The United States was invited by the Bartola government to provide humanitarian and 
disaster relief assistance to Bartola and the organizations operating within it.  ESG-7 
based around the USS ESSEX was dispatched to the region to assume these tasks. 
 
ESG-7 arrived three days ago.  The vessels of the ESG have spent that time positioning 
themselves in the waters around Bartola and Asiland and slowly developing operational 
picture for both the land and sea situations.  Major sea and air lanes were identified, as 
well s several major ports, villages, and cities.  The ESG then placed forces where they 
would best support what the ESG staff believed were their upcoming land and sea 
operations. 
 
A day after the arrival of ESG-7 Bartola officials reported a large uprising in the 
southwest area of Bartola.  Insurgents, now supported by groups from Asiland have 
begun to wrest control of the area from Bartola’s forces.  Bartola’s military units shifted 
to the southwest to counter, but this merely led to a total loss of control of the refugee 
situation along the northern border.  Intelligence suggests that terrorist or cartel forces, 
supported by dissident groups in Bartola and Asiland, may be making a concerted effort 
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to wrest control of the government.  It was also reported that several oil tankers and cargo 
ships were accosted by local pirates.  The government of Bartola has requested United 
States forces to assist them in putting down the insurgency in the southwest.  The United 
States has agreed, and has deployed the bulk of 31st MEU forces to support Bartola’s 
counterinsurgency actions. 
 
Bartola’s military patrols are overwhelmed with tracking and locating the large numbers 
of refugee boats, as well as locating the terrorist and cartel operatives using refugee boats 
for illegal transfers.  Furthermore, Bartola intelligence shared information that several 
coastal defense missile launch sites once located in Asiland are missing.  Bartola 
intelligence believes that some of these launchers may have been moved to new 
locations, possibly, Haven Island.  There is also a strong possibility that Haven Island is 
being used as a pirate base for local terrorist and insurgent groups.  Bartola has requested 
the assistance of the United States and in assisting with the situation at sea. The 
neighboring country to the east, Cathal, has neither resources nor the political/military 




ESG:  4 UAVs SCC: 1 RHIB  (on DDG) MEU: 1 AV8B (on LHA) 
 1 RHIB  (on CG) 1 AH-1  (on LHA) 
 2 XH30  (on FFG) 2 XH30 (on LHA) 
 1 LCU    (on FFG) 1 MSPF (on LSD) 
 2 LCAC (on LSD) 1 MSPF (on LPD) 
 2HH60   (on LHA) 4 RECC (in Bartola) 
 
Note 1: XH30s are conceptual/advanced multi-purpose helos that combine the capabilities of an 
SH60 and UH-1, and are deployable for both sea and ground missions. 
Note 2: Depending on the organizational structure, the 4 UAVs will either be owned by an ISR 
Commander or owned 2 each by the SCC and MEU. 
ESG Commanders Intent 
 
ESG-7 will operate under the concept of Adaptive Command and Control.  ESG-7 is one 
team, one fight.  Remember that while your warfare area is assigned to its traditional 
‘lane of responsibility’ we are an AC2 force.  Everyone must be ready to adapt and 
overcome.  Look to and assist your fellow sailors and marines -- we are here for a single 
purpose.  Advice is not criticism, assistance is not grandstanding.  The people of this 
region need our help, and our country and the world expect us to give it to them.  As one 






1. Support the country and government of Bartola by providing security and 
logistic support. 
2. Provide humanitarian assistance and security to refugees of Asiland. 
3. Protect own forces, Bartola property and vessels, and property of countries 
friendly to US interest in the operating area.  Be prepared to conduct armed 
intervention against acts of piracy and open aggression. 
4. Be perceived as a neutral humanitarian force supporting restoration of public 
welfare. 
 
Rules of Engagement 
 
1.  US forces may engage any surface or ground unit that has initiated an attack or 
demonstrated hostile intent toward US, coalition, NGO or civilian personnel or interests. 
 
 Note:  An attack by one unit or formation does NOT automatically constitute 
criteria for engagement of a separate, non-attacking/non-hostile intent unit or formation. 
2.  Nothing in these rules should be construed as relieving individual commanders of the 
responsibility for self-defense of ship, forces under tactical command/control or forces 
meeting friendly force criteria. 
 
3.  Strikes against oil tankers and merchant vessels are not authorized, only protection 
against attack.  Report any changes in status or actions taken against these ships by 
hostile forces. 
 
4.  Closely monitor the situation in all refugee camps in Bartola.  However, strikes on 
refugee camps are not authorized. 
   CURRENT OPERATION 0600-2359 




1. Sea Search and Rescue: Conduct as necessary. 
2. ISR Taskings from Higher Authority: Complete these tasks as requested. 
3. Fishing Boats: Measure attributes of cargo and temperament initially, and 
after any port visit or after contact with another vessel.  Take action according 
to ZIPPO. 
4. Merchant Vessels: Measure attributes of cargo and status initially, and 
reassess periodically.  Especially reassess each attribute after any port visit 
 74
and when merchant vessels come in contact with another vessel.  Take action 
according to ZIPPO. 
5. Oil Tankers: Conduct initial assessment of status and revisit periodically.  
Take action according to ZIPPO. 
6. Patrol Craft: Monitor country of detected patrol craft periodically to 
determine if any patrol craft becomes bandit.  Take action according to 
ZIPPO. 
7. Coastal Defense Launchers (CDL): Locate CDLs with UAVs.  If 
intelligence indicates a CDL is hostile, take action according to ZIPPO. 





1. ISR Taskings from Higher Authority: Complete these tasks as requested. 
2. Buildings: Measure attributes of activity and temperament and reassess every 
15-20 minutes.  Take action according to ZIPPO. 
3. Coastal Defense Launchers (CDL): If intelligence indicates a located CDL is 
hostile, take action according to ZIPPO. 
4. Fishing Villages: Measure attributes of refugees, weapons and crowd and 
reassess every 15 minutes.  Take action according to ZIPPO. 
5. Ground Search and Rescue: Find location of party with a UAV and conduct 
rescue.  Coordinate with SCC according to ZIPPO. 
6. Military Ground Patrols: Measure attribute of country upon first appearance 
and periodically afterwards.  Take action according to ZIPPO. 
7. Refugee Camps: Measure attributes of weapons and crowd and reassess 
every 15 minutes and not to exceed 15 minutes.  Take action according to 
ZIPPO. 
8. SAM Sites: Locate SAM sites with UAVs.  Take action according to ZIPPO. 
9. Truck Convoys: Locate with any air asset.  Measure attributes of country and 
cargo upon first appearance and reassess every 15-20 minutes afterwards.  
Take action according to ZIPPO. 
10. Coordinate with SCC and ISRC as needed. 
 
ISR Commander Responsibilities: 
 
1.  Control high-value ISR assets (UAVs). 
2.  ISR Taskings from Higher Authority: Conduct as necessary. 
3.  Coordinate with SCC and MEU: Synchronize asset utilization.  Work together 
on task selection and resource allocation. 
4.  Monitor e-mail and intel messages, including ISR tasking from higher 
authority. 
5.  Strive for efficiency in the use of ISR assets. 
 
ISR Coordinator Responsibilities: 
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1. De-conflict asset scarcity problems. 
2. Monitor tasks to assure periodic updates and assessments are current. 
3. Coordinate with SCC and MEU: Synchronize asset utilization.  Work together 
on task selection and resource allocation. 
4. Monitor e-mail and intel messages, including ISR tasking from higher 
authority. 
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APPENDIX F ASSET ACRONYMS 
Asset Acronyms (1 of 2) 
 
CG:  Guided Missile Cruiser, large combat vessels with multiple target 
response capability. They perform primarily in a battle force role and are multi-
mission surface combatants capable of supporting carrier battle groups, 
amphibious forces, or of operating independently and as flagships of surface 
action groups. 
 
DDG:  Guided Missile Destroyer, fast warships that help safeguard larger ships 
by operating in support of carrier battle groups, surface action groups, 
amphibious groups and replenishment groups. Guided missile destroyers are 
multi-mission surface combatants which are also able to provide naval gun fire 
support. 
 
FFG:  Guided Missile Frigate, anti-submarine warfare combatants with an 
additional anti-air warfare capability. 
 
LPD:  Landing Platform Dock, embarks, transports and lands elements of a 
landing force for expeditionary warfare missions. 
 
LSD:  Landing Ship Dock, transports and launches amphibious crafts and 
vehicles with their crews and embarked personnel. They are mainly used to carry 
Landing Craft Air Cushions (LCACs), as well as carrying United States Marines. 
 
LHA:  Amphibious Helo Assault Ship, employed to land and support ground 
forces on enemy territory by an amphibious assault. 
 
LCU:  Landing Craft Utility, used by amphibious forces to transport equipment 
and troops to the shore. They are capable of transporting tracked or wheeled 
vehicles and troops from amphibious assault ships to beachheads or piers. 
 
LCAC:  Landing Craft Air Cushioned, transports, ship-to-shore and across the 
beach, personnel, weapons, equipment, and cargo of the assault elements of the 
Marine Air-Ground Task Force. 
 
RHIB:  Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat, is a light-weight but high performance and 
high capacity boat constructed with a solid, shaped hull and flexible tubes at the 
gunwale. The design is stable and seaworthy. The inflatable collar means that 





Asset Acronyms (2 of 2) 
 
 
MSPF:  Maritime Special Purpose Force, a task-organized force formed from 
elements of a Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable) and naval 
special warfare forces that can be quickly tailored to a specific mission. The 
maritime special purpose force can execute on short notice a wide variety of 
missions in a supporting, supported, or unilateral role. It focuses on operations in 
a maritime environment and is capable of operations in conjunction with or in 
support of special operations forces.  
 
RECC:  Reconnaissance Team, highly trained military units designed to 
conduct specialized operations such as reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, 
and counter-terrorism actions 
 
AV-8:  Light Attack Aircraft (Harrier), primary mission is to provide responsive 
close air support for the ground forces. This single-piloted, advanced 
vertical/short takeoff and landing aircraft can operate from short fields, forward 
sites, roads and surface ships providing minimum response time to targets. 
 
AH-1:  Cobra Helicopter Gunship, primary mission attack and close support. 
 
HH60:  Helicopter, medium-range search and rescue (SAR), drug interdiction, 
cargo lift and special operations.  Significant ISR capabilities. 
 
XH30:  Advanced Concept Multi-Purpose Helicopter, used for anti-submarine 
warfare, search and rescue, drug interdiction, anti-ship warfare, cargo lift, special 
operations, MedEvac, command and control, air assault, personnel and materiel 
transport and as gun ships. 
 
UAV:  Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, is an aircraft with no onboard pilot. UAVs can 
be remote controlled or fly autonomously based on pre-programmed flight plans 
or more complex dynamic automation systems. UAVs are currently used in a 
number of military roles, including reconnaissance and attack. 
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APPENDIX I TASK DESCRIPTION 
Task Description 
 
1.  At Sea Search and Rescue (SOS) 
 
a.  SOS are time critical events that must be dealt with immediately to 
avoid political,  other public relations repercussions or the loss of lives.  This is 
normally a result of a ship having been attacked or having hit a mine. 
 
b.  Once location of the SOS is reported…then dispatch an HH60 to 
rescue survivors. 
 
2.  Buildings (GBLDG) 
 
 a.  Buildings are located along major roads and have the potential to serve 
as basing stations by terrorists and insurgents. 
 
b. Monitor and reassess the following attributes every 15-20 minutes: 
• Temperament (any, friend, uncooperative or hostile) 
• Activity          (normal or suspicious) 
 
c. Attributes may be measured with the following: 
• Temperament – RECC and HH60 
• Activity - UAV or XH30 
 
d. How to perform task is as follows: 
• If normal activity and any temperament…then continue to 
monitor 
• If suspicious activity and friend…then continue to monitor 
• If suspicious activity and uncooperative…then continue to 
monitor 
• If suspicious activity and hostile…then strike with AV8 or AH1 
 
3.  Coastal Defense Missile Launchers (CDL) 
 
 a.  Pirated CDLs pose a threat to U.S. and international shipping in the 
region.  CDLs are not considered hostile until designated hostile by the ESG 
CDR.  If the ESG CDR obtains intel showing  CDLs to be used against shipping, 
the ESG CDR shall order them located and destroyed. 
 
 b.  If intelligence indicates that CDL is hostile (engaged in terrorist or 
insurgent activity)…then strike with AV8 or AH1. 
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4.  Fishing Boats (FB) 
 
a.  Fishing boats are vehicles that transport refugees, terrorist and 
weapons.   
 
b.  Monitor and reassess the following attributes after every port visit or 
after contact with another vessel: 
• Temperament (any, friend, uncooperative or hostile) 
• Cargo (drugs, food, refugees, no cargo, weapons and 
unknown) 
 
c. Attributes may be measured with the following: 
• Temperament – MSPF, XH30, HH60, RHIB or Ships  
• Cargo – UAV, MSPF or RHIB 
 
d. How to perform task is as follows: 
• If drugs and any temperament…then report to ESG CDR 
• If food and any temperament…then report to ESG CDR 
• If refugees and any temperament…then report to ESG CDR 
• If no cargo and any temperament…then report to ESG CDR 
• If weapons and friend…then conduct VBSS with RHIB or MSPF 
and XH30 or any ship or AH1 
• If weapons and uncooperative… then conduct VBSS with RHIB 
or MSPF and XH30 or any ship or AH1 
• If unknown cargo and friend… then conduct VBSS with RHIB or 
MSPF and XH30 or any ship or AH1 
• If unknown cargo and uncooperative…then conduct VBSS with 
RHIB or MSPF and XH30 or any ship or AH1 
•  If weapons and hostile…then conduct ESG level VBSS with 
MSPF and XH30 or any ship 
• If unknown cargo and hostile… then conduct ESG level VBSS 
with MSPF and XH30 or any ship 
 
5.  Fishing Villages (FV) 
 
a.  The four fishing villages on Bartola are the major points of departure 
and entry of refugees, terrorists/insurgents (mingled within the refugees) and 
weapons through the use of the large local fishing fleet.   
 
b.  Monitor and reassess the following attributes every 15 minutes: 
• Refugees (refugees or no refugees) 
• Weapons (weapons or no weapons) 
• Crowd    (any, terrorists or no terrorists) 
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e. Attributes may be measured with the following: 
• Refugees – UAV, RECC, XH30 or  HH60  
• Weapons – UAV or XH30 
• Crowd – RECC or HH60 
 
f. How to perform task is as follows: 
• If no refugees, no weapons and any crowd… then report crowd 
status to ESG CDR 
• If no refugees, weapons and terrorists… then strike with a 
RECC and AH1 or AV8.  MEU must reassess village upon 
completion of strike. 
• If no refugees, weapons and no terrorists…then report 
information to ESG CDR. 
• If refugees, no weapons and any crowd…then report presence 
of refugees to ESG CDR. 
• If refugees, weapons and terrorists…then report to ESG CDR 
(urgent) 
• If refugees, weapons and no terrorists…then report presence of 
refugees to ESG CDR. 
 
6.  Ground Search and Rescue (GS&R) 
 
a.  GS&Rs are time critical events that must be dealt with immediately to 
avoid political, other public relations repercussions or the loss of lives.   
 
b.  UAVs must be used to located and must maintain illumination or GS&R 
until rescue is completed. 
 
c.  Once location of the GS&R is reported…then dispatch an HH60 to 
rescue survivors. 
 
7.  ISR Request 
 
 a.  These are pop-up requests from higher authority to conduct a time 
critical mapping at a specified location.   
 
b. Only a UAV may be used to complete this task. 
 
8.  Merchant Vessels 
  
 a.  Merchant vessels travel the known sea lanes carrying cargo to multiple 
international destinations.  Several merchants deliver relief supplies and 
unfortunately smuggle weapons to terrorist groups in the country.  
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b. Current ROE forbids VBSS action against any merchant vessel in the 
AOR. 
 
c. Monitor and reassess periodically for the following attributes: 
• Cargo (drugs, food, refugees, no cargo or weapons) 
• Status (hijacked, transit, harassed or distressed) 
 
d. Especially reassess each attribute after any port visit and when 
merchant vessel comes in contact with another vessel.    
 
e. Attributes may be measured with the following: 
• Cargo – UAV, MSPF or RHIB  
• Status – MSPF, XH30, HH60, RHIB or Ships 
 
f. How to perform task is as follows: 
• If drugs, food, refugees or no cargo and hijacked, transit, 
harrassed or distresss…then ships carrying relief supplies 
should be closely monitored to ensure they are protected from 
bandit patrol craft or coastal missile attack. 
• If weapons and hijacked, transit, harassed or distressed…then 
report to ESG CDR and MEU.  Report cargo if vessel pulls into 
a Bartola port. 
• Report any unusual status to ESG CDR immediately. 
 
9.  Military Ground Patrol (GMGP) 
 
 a.  Numerous ground patrols are active throughout Bartola.  Insurgents 
and bandits are also moving about the country and may pose as ground patrol. 
 
b. Locate with any air asset. 
 
c.  Measure upon first appearance and periodically afterwards: 
• Country (Bartola, unknown or insurgents) 
 
d.  Attributes may be measured with the following: 
• Country – RECC, XH30 or  HH60  
 
c. How to perform task is as follows: 
• If Bartola or unkown….then report to ESG CDR 
• If insurgents…then strike with AH1, AV8 or XH30 
 
10. Oil Tankers 
 
 a.  Oil tankers transit the sea lanes going to and from oil platforms near 
Cathal.  They are potential targets for terrorist attacks and need to be protected. 
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 b.  Conduct initial assessment and revisit periodically to measure the 
following attributes: 
• Status  (transit, distress, harassed or hijacked) 
 
c.  Attributes may be measured with the following: 
• Status – MSPF, XH30, HH60, RHIB or Ships  
 
d. How to perform task is as follows: 
• If transit…then no further action required 
• If distress…then report information to ESG CDR 
• If harassed…then report information to ESG CDR.  This may be 
a sign that insurgents or bandit patrol boats may be operating in 
the area requiring additional vigilance by SCC 
• If hijacked…then report information to ESG CDR 
 
11. Patrol Crafts 
 
 a.  Patrol crafts are utilized by Asiland, Bartola and Cathal.  All patrol 
crafts are subject to being commandeered by terrorists/insurgents, who can use 
them to do things such as attack merchant vessels or oil tankers.   
 
 b.  Monitor the following attributes periodically to ensure patrol craft does 
not become bandit: 
• Country (Asiland, Bartola, Cathal or Insrugents) 
 
c. Attributes may be measured with the following: 
• Country – UAV, MSPF, XH30, HH60, RHIB or Ships 
 
d.   How to perform task is as follows: 
• If Cathal…then no further action required 
• If Bartola…then no further action required 
• If Asiland…then monitor periodically to ensure patrol craft does 
not become bandit 
• If Insurgents…then strike with XH30 or AV8 
 
12. Refugee Camps 
 
 a.  Four refugee camps are located in Bartola.  They are the location of 
the greatest relief works being conducted and the ultimate destination of all 
refugees in the country. 
There are several of these spread over the countries and islands.  Four are in 
Bartola.   
 
 b.  Reassess the following attributes every 15 minutes (do not allow any 
attribute measurement to be more than 15 minutes old): 
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• Weapons (no weapons or weapons) 
• Crowd (any, terrorists, normal or protestors) 
 
c.  Attributes may be measured with the following: 
• Weapons – UAV or XH30 
• Crowd – RECC or HH60 
  
d.  How to perform task is as follows: 
• If no weapons and any crowd…then reassess every 15 minutes 
and report to ESG CDR 
• If weapons and terrorists…then a strike is not authorized.  MEU 
and SCC report information to ESG CDR for further action.  
Reassess every 15 minutes. 
• If weapons and normal…then reassess every 15 minutes and 
report to ESG CDR 
• If weapons and protestors…then reassess every 15 minutes 
and report to ESG CDR 
 
13. SAM Sites (GSAM) 
 
 a.  All countries in the region have agreed to deactivate their SAM sites 
while the U.S. is conducting humanitarian operations.  A few mobile sites have 
been reported stolen and have been commandeered by terrorists. 
 
b. Must be located by UAVs. 
 
c. UAV must continue to illuminate SAM site until strike is complete. 
 
d. How to perform task is as follows: 
• If SAM site is located…then strike with AV8 and UAV 
   
14. Truck Convoys 
 
 a.  Truck convoys transit throughout Bartola to deliver relief supplies and 
food shipments to refugee camps and fishing villages.   
 
b. Locate with any air asset. 
 
c.  Measure the following attributes upon first appearance and every 15-20 
minutes afterwards: 
• Cargo (any, no weapons or weapons) 
• Country (Bartola, Unpkp or Insurgents) 
 
d.  Attributes may be measured with the following: 
• Cargo – RECC or HH60 
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• Country – UAV, RECC, XH30 or HH60 
 
e. How to perform task is as follows: 
• If Bartola and any cargo…then monitor for protection against 
possible takeover by insurgents 
• If Unpkp and any cargo…then monitor for protection against 
possible takeover by insurgents 
• If insurgents and no weapons…then report to ESG CDR to 
determine the best course of action 
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APPENDIX L DDD BUTTONOLOGY TRAINING 




1) Select target 
2) Zoom in & out (2 ways) 
3) Check what asset is located on platform 
4) Put up range rings and their meaning: 
a. Black:  Detect 
b. Dark blue:  Identify (not use in this version) 
c. Light Blue: Measure 
d. Red:  Attack 
e. Yellow: Be attacked 
f. “Stealth” info on certain tasks 
5) Legend 
6) Move, stop 
7) Attack, using PLC 
8) Info on task 
9) Coordinate joint attack 
Help window 
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